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Lies, Threats and Probabilities in Ultimatum Games 
 
Mark Ferreira 
 
Abstract:  Many papers have used the ultimatum game as a means to test 
bargaining behavior. A subset of experiments has examined the use of cheap talk 
and asymmetric in bargaining scenarios. Yet, this earlier work leaves out many of 
the complicated factors that occur in bargaining in the real world. No research has 
looked at the interaction of probabilities and threats in ultimatum games. The 
experiment described here makes two novel modifications to the ultimatum game: 
First: participant’s have the ability to send threats. Second: the game uses 
probabilities to determine whether or not the endowment size becomes revealed. 
The data show that both threats and probabilities affect the outcomes of the game in 
interesting ways.  Threats affect the amount offered by proposers but do not have a 
large influence on lying whereas a higher probability of being revealed decreases 
lying. The implications from this research helps shed light on why we have many 
institutions dedicated to eliminating uncertainty from a multitude of transactions.  
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Introduction 
Every day, people make decisions with varying degrees of information. Investors 
have to chose which stocks they think will do well, someone looking for a used car 
has to assess an estimate of its worth, a company might need to figure out the long 
term growth prospects of a potential acquisition. All of these decisions revolve 
around aspects of bargaining. Economists have trouble studying the nuances of 
these activities, as they cannot isolate the subtle details involved in these 
transactions. The ultimatum game gives researchers the tools to study this behavior 
in a laboratory setting. This experiment is a classic experiment in economics where 
one person, the proposer, is allocated a certain amount of money, the endowment. 
The proposer can send any amount of the endowment to the responder. The 
responder can either accept the proposer’s offer or reject it. If the responder rejects 
the offer both participants get nothing; if the responder accepts, s/he gets the offer 
while the proposer received the offer subtracted from the endowment. Many 
experiments have studied how different variables affect offers in ultimatum games, 
but few have focused on how threats, lies and cheap talk affect the game.  
Cheap talk and lying involve communication between players that will not 
directly alter the payoffs in a game. They also include the ability to either lie or make 
threats in ultimatum games. For example, will proposers risk rejection by a 
responder by lying about a pie size? Would threats by responders promote the 
proposers to be more honest? While these questions have been addressed under 
simplified settings, no research has studied the proposers’ likelihood of lying when 
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they know there is a probability that the lie might be revealed. Given the role that 
communication and probability interact in bargaining situations, these variables 
provide important insights into how people behave in reality. Introducing 
uncertainty, in combination in with communication, helps isolate the effects of these 
conditions on bargaining behavior.  
The best way to model lying behavior in ultimatum games involves the use of 
asymmetrical information. This methodology also relates to a common real world 
situation where one party hides vital information from another. One obvious and 
classic example is the used car market. In this market the dealer knows the true 
value of the car but the buyer does not. Will the dealer sell a bad car to the buyer 
with a chance that the seller will not find out? Or does he withhold bad cars from the 
market in order to protect the reputation of the dealership? Similarly, newly 
established brands or products face the same issue. The company knows the true 
quality of the work but the consumer is unaware. Studying incomplete information 
in ultimatum game can help model the strategies used in the market for used items 
or newly established brands and products. 
The paper will continue as follows. The literature review will start with an 
overview of the external validity of the ultimatum game using Akerlof’s (1970) 
framing of asymmetric information in markets. Then I will detail the history and 
substantial changes made to the ultimatum game from its inception to now. Next, I 
will overview the literature on lying, followed by communication and lastly, 
asymmetric information. The next sections will describe the design and results. The 
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paper will finish by addressing limitations, a discussion of my findings in context 
with the literature and lastly a conclusion.  
 
External Validity 
Many experimenters often underplay or fail to mention the relevance of their 
experiments outside of the lab. More articles should focus on how the results 
connect to the real world where billions of economic decisions occur every day. In 
terms of uncertainty and incomplete information, Akerlof (1970) provides one of 
the best theoretical papers by using the example of a used car market.  Akerlof 
envisions a scenario where sellers have a car of some level of quality. The buyers are 
interested in purchasing one of these used cars but do not know the quality level of 
the car itself. Akerlof assumes that a car has a quality of good or bad and a 
probability (q) that the car is good. In this model, the bad cars will cause the owners 
of the good cars to leave the market, as their good cars will sell for the same price as 
bad ones due to asymmetric information. Furthermore, sellers want more than the 
expected value of an average car and buyers are not willing to pay more than the 
expected value at all price levels, meaning all the cars will fail to sell. This analysis 
shows how markets surrounding uncertainty work. People need verification of the 
quality of goods or the market simply fails and no one will buy anything.  
While Akerlof uses this theoretical car auction to mathematically illustrate 
his conclusions, many other industries follow a similar pattern. For instance, 
insurance providers will never have complete information about people who apply 
for their plans. Furthermore, Akerlof shows how the theory holds up in practice. He 
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cites data that shows that as people age, they will lose medical insurance. Medicare 
and, more recently, The Affordable Car Act have taken measures to fix the problem 
of adverse selection in the healthcare industry. Akerlof also discusses the issue of 
dishonesty as it applies to developing countries. He asserts that markets in 
developing countries have a wider range in quality. In this sense, people who have 
the skills to pick the better items do well as merchants or entrepreneurs. Of course, 
this dishonesty carries a cost as it drives the expected value of all goods sold on the 
market down. Akerlof concludes his famous paper by indicating the importance of 
trust. If people believe others and behave honestly, these types of market failures 
simply would not exist. However, we do not inhabit such a world and dishonesty 
enters the equation.  
Akerlof’s model shows the importance of the research presented in this 
paper. In reality, buyers can evaluate the item they purchase and will either trust or 
distrust the seller from that point on. They also have the option to try to punish the 
seller in some fashion. However, there also exists a probability that the seller will 
refuse to use deception or that the buyer will never discover the seller’s duplicity. 
My experiment is the first of its kind, as it takes some of the abstractions that exist in 
reality and quantifies them. Akerlof’s analysis gives the perfect framework for 
extending my results to a common market scenario.  Extending Akerlof’s initial 
ideas, reviews on sites like EBay in a sense help shift the expected value of an item 
through creating a system where the chances of deception decrease. Essentially, my 
research explores whether these types of measures will actually affect deception. 
The possibility of reviewing an item acts as an increase in the probability of 
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revealing an actual value of an item. Reviewing exists everywhere; financial 
institutions constantly review companies and countries for their ability to pay back 
debt. Car Facts now exists to eliminate uncertainty in the buyer. By modeling these 
situations in the lab, I can model behavior where a seller may choose to use a site 
like Craigslist that does not have review or a site like Amazon where thousands of 
users review products. 
 
History 
The ultimatum game was introduced by Guth et al. (1982).  The authors took the 
structure of a bargaining game and limited the play period to a single round. He 
wanted to go beyond studying repeated play where the strategy involved 
continuous decision-making. In this situation, participants need to anticipate the 
behavior of the person with whom they are paired.  He ran several trials and varied 
the amount of money that proposer could divide. Like most authors after them, Guth 
et al. shows how his results contradict the predictions of economic rationality. 
Responders in these experiments typically did not accept offers that they found 
unfair. Essentially the minor penalty of forgoing a small amount appears worth the 
ability to punish a proposer for his or her selfishness.  
Perhaps the most important alteration came from Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1986) when they presented the results of a variety of experiments. Most 
importantly, they invented the basic structure for the dictator game. This 
experiment follows the procedure of the ultimatum game except that responders 
cannot make a decision and receives whatever the proposer offers them. They first 
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ran a simple dictator game where an allocator could keep $18 and send $2 or split 
the $20 evenly with $10 going to each player. In this condition 76% of people chose 
the even option. The researchers tried to eliminate the effect of the responder in 
order to see whether the results in ultimatum games were the result of fairness or 
strategic play. While these initial results suggest people favor fair play, this game 
does not take into account a spectrum of splits like the ultimatum game. Here, 
participants could pick one of two options whereas the ultimatum game allowed for 
any offer. Therefore, between a grotesquely unfair option and a completely fair one, 
people may opt for the even split. Yet, if a proposer could pick any amount to send, 
the results might differ. Later research covered these alterations (Hoffman et al 
1994, Forsythe et al. 1994). Forsythe et al. receive credit for creating the dictator 
game in its standard form. 
Other researchers looked at a variety of factors that influence the results of 
the game. Roth (1991), for example, looks at both bargaining behavior across 
countries as well as a multi-person bargaining game that closely resembles the 
ultimatum game. In his multi-person game, Roth phrased his variation in terms of 
buyers and sellers. He conducted a ten-round experiment where participants were 
randomly paid for the results of one round. Buyers essentially acted as proposers; 
they told sellers the price or offer they would accept for a good. Sellers, therefore, 
represent responders. The experimenter then wrote the highest offer amongst all 
proposers on a chalkboard. Responders then accepted or rejected the proposed 
offer. Interestingly, Roth included one responder in each market with multiple 
proposers. This experiment presents a situation where multiple proposers try to get 
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a singular responder to accept an offer. This procedure actually shifts the power 
from the proposer to the responder. With multiple offers, and with the highest offer 
being the only one accepted or rejected, the proposers will try to offer the 
responders the highest amount in order to have the opportunity to earn a pay off.   
Roth ran this experiment in three different countries, The U.S, Israel, Japan, 
and Slovenia. In each country, proposers had 1,000 tokens to offer the responders. 
Across the board, the offers rose in each iteration of the game and eventually offers 
reached the 1,000 token maximum.  While his study does not prove that these 
effects will happen everywhere, running the game in multiple countries and getting 
similar results shows how the basic principle of bargaining games can transcend 
national boundaries and are not strictly cultural.  
Along with changing the structure of the game, Roth also ran typical 
bargaining games in several countries. The bargaining game consists of 10 rounds 
where two players bargain over offers. If the offer is accepted the proposer keeps 
the endowment subtracted from the offer and the responder keeps the offer. 
However, if the responder rejects the offer, both players get nothing for that round. 
This structure differs from the ultimatum game in that the bargaining game lasts for 
multiple rounds, compared to the one-shot structure of the ultimatum game. Cross 
culturally, Japan and Israel experienced lower offers than the other countries. Roth 
cites Guth et al.’s (1982) ideas about fairness to explain this trend and suggests that 
each country has notions of fairness. For example, Israel and Japan might have lower 
offers because people would not expect strangers to exhibit fairness.  
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Roth ends his paper by discussing that people do not behave purely 
rationally, no matter which setting they are in. While different nations may 
experience fairness differently, none of the countries reached the game-theoretic 
equilibrium for this game. Therefore, Roth expands the discussion on behavioral 
economics by rejecting the strict assumptions set earlier.  
Along with Roth, Hoffman et al. (1996, 1994) produced critical research for 
understanding ultimatum game behavior. Hoffman et al. (1994) focused on earned 
roles in ultimatum games. In this design, the role of proposer and responder are not 
chosen at random. Instead, participants take a general knowledge quiz and those 
who score better earn the right to make the division. Hoffman et al. ran both 
ultimatum and dictator games to test this effect. The authors found that when 
participants earned the role of the proposer, they offered significantly less to the 
responder than in the control trials. Specifically, in the earned trials only 45% of 
proposers offered $4 or more compared to 85% in the standard game. In earned-
role dictator games, only 4% of dictators gave $4 or more but 20% gave $3 or $4. 
Overall, while the distribution of all offers in the dictator game decreased with 
entitlements when compared to a condition without entitlements, most proposers 
offered more than zero.  Hoffman et al. (1994) argue that this result shows how 
even with earned roles people still act somewhat generously. Lastly, the researchers 
question whether these ideals of fairness come from social pressure. In order to find 
out, they ran a double blind version of the dictator game. In double blind 
experiments, decisions are unknown to the researchers and other participants 
rather than just other participants. In this trial only 11% of proposers gave $3 or 
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more to receivers. Hoffman et al. (1994) assert that participants act in a way that 
causes them to behave more generously if the experimenter knows their decisions. 
In other words, controlling for this effect might have a large impact on the 
experiment itself. Most importantly, this research shows how fairness can be altered 
depending greatly on social conditions. Hoffman et al. raise important questions 
about how future research should carefully consider how fairness is measured. They 
also explore interesting aspects of human psychology that economists may overlook 
when attempting to study behavior and decisions making.  
Building on the 1994 study, Hoffman et al. (1996) test the effect of anonymity 
directly. The authors’ research has important implications for how future scholars 
run ultimatum games and economic experiments. In this experiment, they used the 
dictator game with different states of anonymity to test social pressure and notions 
of fairness. The essential question behind this study asks the following question:  do 
proposers in the dictator game send offers based on pro-social behavior or whether 
the experimenter’s potential judgment influence sharing behavior? In order to 
achieve complete anonymity, Hoffman et al. create a design where one subject acts 
as a monitor and will pass envelopes between the subjects. The key here is that 
these envelopes have blank pieces of paper as well as $1 bills. This procedure 
ensures that not even the monitor can tell the amount that the proposers offer. They 
also ran other trials where the procedure allowed for less anonymity. The results 
show that, when dictators have more social distance from the experimenters, they 
offer less to the receiver. However, 62% of dictators still gave $2 or more. Perhaps 
the reasoning behind this trend lies in reciprocity (Hoffman et al. 1996). Humans 
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may have a strong drive to help others and expect something in return for doing so. 
Yet, Hoffman et al. fails to go into detail about these principles. It would have 
strengthened the paper to explore the psychology behind this type of pro-social 
result.   While this research does not rule out ingrained social values, it shows the 
importance of experimental design and procedure. Researchers should always try to 
control for as many factors as possible when designing experiments. Hoffman et al 
(1996) prove that anonymity is one vital factor in behavior during bargaining 
games. 
Social distance is one of many conditions that have an effect on the results of 
dictator and ultimatum games. The stake size in experimental economics may also 
greatly affect the results of these games. When stakes are low, participants may not 
act as selflessly. Specifically, in the ultimatum game, proposers might offer less and 
responders might have a harder time rejecting lower offers when they have to say 
no to a larger sum of money. Andersen et al. (2011) attempted measure the effect of 
the endowment size in the ultimatum game. The authors ran four different trials of 
the ultimatum game, representing eight different wealth treatments. In one group, 
participants had wealth before the experiment began; in the non-wealth group 
participants started the games with nothing. The authors ran the same set of stake 
increases with both groups. The experiment took place in rural India where the 
highest wealth treatment ran the game with 20, 200, 2,000 and 20,000 rupees. At 
the time of the paper the endowment of the highest wealth treatment was worth 
$410. On average, Andersen et al. (2011) report that villagers earned 100 rupees on 
average. Clearly, the highest wealth treatment represents an incredibly large sum to 
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these people. Two clear results emerge from this research. First, as the endowment 
increases, the proportion of the endowment offered decreases. The entire 
distribution of offers shifts toward zero when the endowment increases. The 
authors confirm the statistical significance of this pattern. Second, rejection rates 
decrease drastically when stakes increase. For the wealth groups, rejections 
decreased from a high of 47% in the 200 rupee treatment to a low of 8% in the 
20,000 rupee treatment. In the no wealth group, rejections decreased from a high of 
42% in the 200 rupee treatment to 0% with the 20,000 rupee treatment.  
These results reveal important aspects of human behavior. As stake sizes get 
larger, responders proportionately act more in their self-interest. It feels much 
harder to turn down 20% of 20,000 than 20% of 200. Similarly, proposers will want 
to keep as much as they possibly can and might offer the bare minimum that they 
think will not face rejection In the high stakes treatments, they must suspect that 
they will need to offer a proportionately small amount. Interestingly, Andersen et al. 
(2011) suggest that the demand for punishment decreases as the money increases. 
This result indicates that that the demand for punishment slopes downward.  
Although this paper does a great job in exploring how drastic increases in 
stakes change the ultimatum game, the results may not be easily replicable for 
several reasons. The experiment takes place solely in rural India, meaning the 
results may not be generalizable to other areas. Furthermore, funding this type of 
experiment middle-to upper income countries faces budget restraints. Lastly, there 
are some ethical concerns with providing people with such great windfalls of cash 
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for participating in research. It may appear patronizing to people in areas like rural 
India to use their inhabitants as a cheap way to test economic behavior.  
The last important manipulation of the ultimatum in this review is Binmore 
et al’s (1985) examination of a shrinking endowment size. In this design, Player 1 
and Player 2 first bargain over a pie size of 100 pence. This part of the game follows 
the standard ultimatum game procedure with Player 1 proposing an offer and with 
Player 2 having the option to either accept or reject it. However, if Player 2 rejects 
the offer, the game continues into a second stage. In this stage, the endowment 
shrinks to 25 pence; Player 2 gets to propose an offer and Player 1 can either accept 
or reject. In stage 2, a rejection results in both players receiving nothing. In terms of 
game theory, the authors show that the first proposal should demand 74 pence for 
the proposer. Player 2 cannot possibly obtain more than 25 pence in the second 
round (Binmore et al. 1985). Unfortunately, the authors presented the results in 
terms of opening demands and not rejection rates. They presented the demands 
from two games, Game A and Game B. Game A incorporated all recruited 
participants. In Game B, participants who filled the role of Player 2 in Game A 
switched to occupy the Player 1 role in a new trial. In Game A, most proposers in 
stage 1 offered around 50 of the 100 pence. However, in Game B, the opening 
demands of Player 2 went up to center around the 75 pence mark. This change 
shows how Player 2’s shifted their behavior to act more in line with the game 
theoretical predictions. Although the authors unfortunately leave out rejection rates, 
this paper shows how learning can cause participants to act more line with theory. 
Player 2’s who have played the game before know the best strategy for making 
 14
money, and they adhere to it more than first timers. The research also presents an 
interesting way to break down the ultimatum game with changing endowment sizes. 
Ultimately, the ultimatum game provides an interesting method for analyzing 
the economic behavior of people. It provides a model that researchers can easily 
tweak to suit their interests or needs. Through the game and its modifications, we 
can understand nuanced aspects of behavior that become difficult to observe and 
analyze outside of laboratory conditions. 
 
Lying 
 Asymmetric information creates an opportunity for studying outright 
deception and lying. The articles reviewed in this section focus on lying as a form of 
behavior in experimental economic settings. Lundquist et al. (2009) tested lying in a 
contract game. In this experiment, Player A’s have a score taken from a test that 
determines their payoffs.  In some treatments, they can lie in order to try to get 
Player B’s to agree to a contract and receive a higher payoff for themselves. The 
authors ran several different trials to test how language and communication 
affected behavior. In a weak promise trial, Player A could send a message that reads, 
“My score is X”.  In the strong promise trial Player A’s message is “I solemnly 
promise that my score is X”. This difference tests how lying behavior might change 
depending on the language and format of the experiment. In a third variation, 
participants could send a free form message to the other player. The authors broke 
down lies between deceptive lies and white lies. In the structure of the game, white 
lies would ensure both players would receive higher payoffs. The results showed 
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that all lies decreased from 56% in the weak promise round to 46% in the strong 
promise and 28% in free form communication. Lastly, Lundquist et al. (2009) also 
designed a questionnaire to test the perceptions of the participants in the study with 
regards to lying. Participants predicted with some accuracy the proportions of low 
talent sellers that actually lied. Interestingly, 93% of participants said that they 
would be less likely to lie if there was chance of discovery. If this survey is a good 
measure, then the variation in probability of getting caught should affect lying 
behavior. Arguably, the most important aspect of this research is that it shows that 
strong promises and free form communication decreases lying. As such, 
experimenters should take care to ensure their designs follow neutral wording that 
will not bias the results.  
 Gneezy (2005) also examines deception in a simple game with 
predetermined messages. Player 1 knows the payoffs of two options, A and B. He or 
she can then send a message that reads, “Option A will earn you more money than 
Option B” or another message that claims the opposite. Next, Player 2 chooses an 
option. This game presents a modified version of the ultimatum game with 
incomplete information. In this experiment, however, responders cannot outright 
reject but instead they must choose an option that they know nothing about. Gneezy 
ran three treatments. One round the difference in payouts was only $1 between the 
options. In another round, option A can give 5 to Player 1 and 15 to Player 2 and 
action B gave 6 to Player 1 and 5 to Player 2. The last where Option A gives 15 to 
Player 1 and 5 to Player 2 and B can give 5 to Player 1 and 15 to Player 2. The 
results showed that as the profit for lying increases the proportion of lying behavior 
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also increases. In third treatment, where the Player 1 can profit directly from lying, 
52% of Player 1s lied. Interestingly, 80% of Player 2s chose the options that Player 1 
claimed was beneficial for them. Lastly, Gneezy presents a scenario and asks 
participants whether they think that they are fair or unfair. He uses the example of a 
seller potentially omitting an issue with a used car. The seller will pass the cost of 
the repair on to the buyer if the car overheats. Most people thought that the seller 
not telling the buyer about the issue was “unfair” or “very unfair.”  
Through his experimental design and survey questions, Gneezy sheds 
important light on when people lie. He points out in his discussion that, in this 
experiment, there were no negative consequences to lying. When people might be 
punished for their deception their behavior could change drastically. The capability 
of punishment acts as a better model for reality and most likely there will be a 
chance of the victim discovering a fraudulent claim. 
 
Communication 
Many studies have explored how offers by proposers in ultimatum games change by 
introducing communication as an extra step in the experimental process. Xiao and 
Houser (2005) set out to see whether the ability for responders to express emotion 
changed either the proposed split of money or the rejection rates by responders. 
The authors introduced the ability for responders to send messages to proposers 
about the split of money with their acceptance or rejection of the offer. They 
hypothesized that responders, given the ability to signal their emotions with words 
and not just money, would be more willing to accept lower offers. They ran a 
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traditional ultimatum game for one treatment referred to as NEE, for “no emotional 
expression”; in the other treatment responders could send emotional messages back 
to proposers with their decision (referred to as EE). The results showed that there 
was not a statistically significant difference between the offers made by proposers 
in either treatment. However, responders in the EE treatment accepted unfair offers 
at a much higher rate than in the NEE treatment. This research shows that 
expression of emotion can cause responders to accept lower offers. Many of the 
messages regarding unfair offers showed that responders will begrudgingly accept 
lower offers if they can attempt to make the proposer feel bad. In the absence of 
emotion, people will use tools, in this case money, to express their beliefs. However, 
once they can relay their feelings, it becomes worth it to accept a smaller offer 
rather than pass on the chance to earn something.  Xiao and Houser (2004) conclude 
that it is this release of emotion that causes the lowered rejection rate in the 
treatment with emotional expression.  
Similar to Xiao and Houser (2005), Rankin (2003) examined how 
communication shapes the offers made in ultimatum games. In his experiment, 
responders could make requests of proposers before proposers submitted their 
offers. The author ran two treatments. The control treatment consisted of a 
traditional ultimatum game. The experimental treatment let responders send a 
message to the proposer requesting a certain division of the money.  The results 
showed that requests by responders both lowered the amount offered by the 
proposer and, as a consequence, caused higher rejection rates. Rankin (2003) 
offered no concrete reason why the requests had the effects that they did. However, 
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he suggests that proposers may have interpreted the requests as bluffs because 
responders would accept offers lower than their requested amounts. This paper 
interestingly shows that communication may actually deter higher offers. 
Furthermore, the responder’s requests generally suggested a division that gave the 
responder over half of the money available. Proposers might have felt threatened by 
what they interpreted as an unfair request and decided to punish the responders by 
giving them low offers. 
 
Asymmetric Information 
The ability for proposers and responders to communicate adds new and 
interesting elements to the ultimatum game. Moving beyond these designs, other 
studies show the effects of incomplete information in a multitude of ways. Some 
studies give the proposer the option to lie. Other studies provide an outside option, 
not known to the other player. These designs help test how people will take 
advantage of incomplete information in the experiments to win more money.  
Early on, the ultimatum game dealt mostly with studying notions of fairness 
and not as a means to test the effects of deception. Kagel (1996) was one of the first 
researchers to develop games that tested asymmetric information and by extension 
provided the first model in which proposers could implicitly use deceit to their 
advantage. He set up two different conversion rates for chips to bargain with. For 
one group, chips had higher values and for the other chips had lower values. In the 
different sessions, proposers and responders either had chip valued at $.10 or $.30. 
In the experiment, proposers chose how many chips to offer responders out of the 
 19
100-chip endowment. When only proposers knew the monetary payoffs of these 
chips, they consistently offered far less than a perfectly fair amount of the 
endowment.  Furthermore, responders rejected these unfair offers at a lower rate 
than in other studies with complete information. In other words, proposers made 
offers that appeared fair in terms of chips, but in reality, they made off with a much 
larger take. In the condition where proposers knew the value of the chips and had 
the low, $.10 payoff, responders rejected 21% of offers. Presumably this result came 
from the false perception of unfairness.  
Schmitt (2004) follows a nearly identical procedure to Kagel, except he takes 
the experiment a step further and explores the difference in offers when proposers 
and responders have an outside option. An outside option provides a pay off that 
does not result from the actions of the players in the game. Essentially, it gives both 
players less of an incentive to accept low offers as they might benefit from a 
disagreement.  The author set up an ultimatum game that used chips in place of 
money. Players bargained over 100 chips either valued at $.30 or $.10  and a 
disagreement payoff of $2.00 or $0, depending on the treatment.  In these trials 
participants all have the same chip value within their role of responders or 
proposers.  In half of the treatment groups, players knew the value of the chips held 
and whether or not there was a disagreement payoff. In the second half of 
treatments, players did not have perfect information and only were made aware 
that the other person’s chip values were not the same as their own. Players then 
played ten rounds as either a proposer or responder and were matched with a 
different person each round. The results showed that when proposers had a higher 
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chip value and the outside option they offered a lower than even monetary split of 
the chips. When responders had the outside option with proposers still having 
higher chip values, the offers, in terms of money, increased when compared to 
proposers having the outside option. When responders had higher chip values, 
proposers offered more, in terms of money, compared to the rounds mentioned 
above. When proposers had the outside option with responders having higher chip 
values, proposers offered, on average, less, in terms of money than when responders 
had the outside option.  
 Next the experimenter repeated the above trials except that the participants 
were not aware of the other’s chip values or any outside options. If responders do 
not know the value of the chips, they might accept offers that they perceive as fair 
but in reality heavily favor the proposer. With incomplete information, responders 
rejected no offer of more than 40 chips (Schmitt 2004). Furthermore, rejections 
were far less frequent and proposers acted much more strategically. In the first 
round, proposers seemed to behave altruistically as the average offer was over 40 
chips. However, offers drastically decreased in subsequent rounds. Proposers tried 
to figure out the minimum amount of chips required to ensure that their offer would 
be accepted. Responders had no monetary reference to judge whether or not offers 
were fair. Instead they relied on what appeared to be a fair split of chips.  In terms of 
money, this technique worked well when proposers had higher valued chips; 
monetary and chip offers decreased. However, when responders had higher chip 
values, the incomplete information worked in responders’ favor. Proposers actually 
offered more both in terms of money and chips when they did not know responders 
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had a higher chip value. Overall, mean offers dropped throughout each round as 
responders continued to accept lower and lower amounts of chips.  
Expanding on the chip procedure developed by Schmitt (2004) and Kagel 
(1996), Koning et al. (2011) test the effects of cheap talk and deception. The authors 
set up two experiments to test whether people who have more perceived power use 
deception more often. In their design, participants played the game with computer-
simulated opponents. In all treatments participants played the role of a responder 
and were paired with a computerized proposer. The authors created an interesting 
dynamic by multiplying the proposed offer by different multipliers, .9 in one case 
and .1 in another. The researchers told participants that their chips were worth .08 
euros to them and .04 to the proposer. Responders had the option to use deception 
and claim their chip values were .04 or not use deception and express their chip 
value honestly at .08. The lower multiplier results in a lower amount of money for 
the responder. Therefore, responders with low multipliers might feel disadvantaged 
in this situation. The game gets more complicated as now participants gain the 
ability to send a message and lie about the relative chip values. Introducing this 
dynamic brings the possibility of studying a variety of factors relating to cheap talk. 
Although the experimenters paired the participants with computers, this study 
shows the value in being able to assess how people can take advantage of their 
situation. Pairing participants with a computer enabled the study to focus more on 
isolating the effects of the multiplier variable in isolation with respect the roles 
within the experiment. Responders who had a lower multiplier acted more 
deceptively than participants without it. In other words, they lied more frequently 
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about their respective payoffs in the messages they sent. By claiming that they had a 
lower chip value, responders might hope for proposers to send them more chips and 
therefore, receive more money. For proposers, multiplier roles had no effect on the 
use of deception. 
While these articles shed light on how incomplete information affects how 
proposers divide offers in ultimatum games, they share one major flaw. The use of 
chips, instead of money, while a seemingly good way to incorporate incomplete 
information, does not translate easily into an actual monetary transaction. 
Specifically, the most concerning result is that when there was incomplete 
information, proposers gave responders more than 50% of the even monetary split 
(Schmitt 2004). This result comes from the fact that responders in the incomplete 
information trials based their decision not on how much money they received but 
on the amount of chips proposers offered. Thus, the chips created a false reference 
point that responders used to judge fairness.  
Croson et al. (2003) solve the problem of incomplete information by creating 
an experiment where the responder has no knowledge of the pie size that the 
proposer is charged with splitting. The paper also explores how threats and lying 
affect the offers in the ultimatum game. In addition to an unknown pie size, the 
researchers also added the possibility that the responders had an unknown outside 
option in the form of a disagreement payoff. Each proposer and responder was 
allowed to send messages to each other about the pie size and outside option 
respectively. Both the proposer and responder could claim that the pie size or 
outside option was any number between a set of values. First the responder had the 
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opportunity to send a message to the proposer with information about their outside 
option or a threat. Next, the proposer sent a message with his/her offer. The game 
then was repeated once with the private information remaining unrevealed. Then, 
in certain trials, private information was revealed and the participants played a final 
two rounds. In each round, the participant’s kept the same role and the same 
partner. The researchers created several conditions: In the control both participants 
knew the values of the pie size and the outside option. In the second treatment they 
tested a condition in which the responder did not know the pie size with no chance 
of it being revealed. In a third treatment the responders saw the pie size at the end 
of the experiment.  
The results showed that when the responder exaggerated the size of their 
outside option, they received significantly higher offers from proposers. Similarly, 
responder threats slightly increased offers but increased rejection rates as well. 
When proposers lied about their pie size, they gave much lower offers without a 
lower rejection rate by responders. The article also examines the long-term effects 
of lying across multiple rounds. When responder lies were revealed, offers 
decreased only slightly. However, when proposer lies were revealed, subsequent 
offers were significantly higher across the remaining rounds.  
Other studies also followed this model to address more nuanced components 
of games with asymmetric information. Besancenot et al. (2013) present an 
experimental design very similar to my own. The authors follow a comparable 
procedure to Croson et al. (2003). Besancenot et al. gave proposers the ability to 
send a potentially deceptive message to the responder regarding the size of the 
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endowment. In these trials, the responder could not verify whether the proposers 
told the truth or not. The authors prove theoretically that proposers should 
understate the endowment amount. In doing so, they can make it appear like the 
responders receive a larger chunk of the pie than in actuality. They found that the 
models accurately predict proposer behavior. The vast majority of proposers (88.5 
percent) lied about how much money they received. Furthermore, proposers chose 
to understate their endowments by 20.5% on average. They also quantify the payoff 
from misrepresenting the endowment. A one Euro gap between the stated and real 
endowment led to a .19 Euro lower offer by proposer on average. Lastly, the authors 
mention that proposers believe that the responders will take their messages at face 
value.  
 Besancenot et al. (2013) show the role that strategy can play in asymmetric 
information. Other authors (Kagel 1996, Schmitt 2004), created scenarios where 
proposers maintained an advantage over responders, but could not express it except 
with the size of their offers. By including the ability for proposers to contact 
responders, the authors added a whole new element into the ultimatum game: how 
the option to misinform directly affects the behavior of the proposer in terms offers 
and deceit. Veselý (2014) also tested deception in the ultimatum game.  Proposers 
in his design knew the size of the endowment. Along with an offer, proposers sent a 
message that stated the size of the pie to the responders. Veselý then collected the 
offers and redistributed to the same participants randomly. Therefore, the same 
people played both of the roles as responder and proposer. The procedure allowed 
for the pie size to fluctuate between 20 and 200 in multiples of 20. Veselý reports 
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similar results to Besancenot et al. (2013). Proposers consistently understated the 
endowment. Proposers received an average of 108.06 and stated they received 
59.06 experimental Korunas on average. In this case, 96% of proposers deceived the 
responders in at least one round and 43% acted dishonestly in all three consecutive 
rounds. These results confirm the trends observed in Besancenot et al.’s study. 
When given the option to lower offers through lying, proposers will seize the 
opportunity and act in their self-interest. Kriss et al. (2013) also looked at deceptive 
proposer behavior by giving proposers the option to send a message in an 
ultimatum game. The authors compared deception across high endowment and low 
endowment treatments. However, they also added a step where proposers sent a 
promise to the responder regarding the accuracy of their message. When proposers 
had to make promises regarding their messages, they used less deception in the 
messages they sent. However, the ability to send a message without a promise 
increases lying behavior in proposers. Specifically, 88.5% of proposers 
misrepresented the endowment in the message treatment and 65% lied when they 
sent a promise along with their message. The threats in my experiment might cause 
proposers to have some sympathy or feel like they need to act more honestly. 
However, a personal promise differs greatly from the threat of a stranger.  
 
Demographics 
Researchers cannot address all variables of importance by altering the test design. 
In fact, demographic variables, specifically gender and personal characteristics, can 
have an effect on the propensity to lie. Childs (2012) conducted an experiment to 
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directly test gendered behavior in a variation of the ultimatum game. For half of the 
subjects, proposers could either keep C$15 dollars and send C$5 or keep C$5 and 
send C$5. For the other half, proposers could keep C$5 and send C$15 or keep C$5 
and send C$5. The crux of the experiment is that proposers could send one of two 
pre-written messages. If in the second half, the proposer claims that the option of 
both participants receiving 5 is best for the responder, then the proposer lied as 
another option gives the responder 15 and the proposer 5. The message supposedly 
informs the responder about which option will earn them more money. Thus, the 
proposer could claim that they chose an option that would earn the responder more 
money.  In actuality, the proposer could choose either option regardless of the 
message they send. Childs found that 57.3% of the participants lied about the option 
that would benefit the responder most. Most importantly, the author’s results do not 
show a significant difference between the behavior of men and women.  
In contrast to these results, Veselý’s (2014) study found definitive 
differences between genders. Women not only made lower offers, but they also 
engaged in more deception than their male counterparts. These results might 
contradict Childs’ for several reasons. Childs’ experiment had an incredibly 
straightforward design that offered a choice between two options. In Veselý’s 
design, proposers have the option to lie about the endowment by any amount and 
then to act on that lie in terms of an offer. In other words, the more complex 
procedure might draw out differences that did not appear obvious in the 
experiment conducted by Childs.  
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 Garcia-Gallego et al. (2012) also explored gendered aspects of the ultimatum 
game. The authors study whether risk preferences cause differences in results or 
whether other factors come into play. The authors use an established lottery game 
to measure their participant’s attitudes toward risk. In order to avoid abstraction, 
the authors frame the game from the perspective of an employer offering a value 
and an employee having the ability to accept or reject it. They also control using the 
regular wording in two out of the three trials. In two of three trials the pairing is 
random and in trial three it remains fixed. Participants also filled out an evaluation 
of the game about their expectations of the pay offs before the monetary trials 
began. The results show that with regards to risk preferences, women exhibit more 
risk aversion. While women reject more throughout the experiment, this result was 
especially prevalent in the employer treatment. Also, women offered significantly 
less in the employer treatment than men. Lastly, the authors show that the gender 
differences in the ultimatum game do not stem from differences in risk aversion. 
Generally, risk-averse players will offer more in order to reduce the chance of a 
rejection. However, as we saw in the employer game, women offered less and in the 
other trials the gender difference was minimal.  
This research helps eliminate one of the theories behind gender differences. 
However, this is a divided topic and different authors present different cases (Veselý 
2014, Childs 2012). Seeing as how gender effects emerged only in the employer 
trial, language and framing might have a significant impact. If researchers across the 
board use varying languages, the confusion could stem from these nuanced and 
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subtle differences. Ultimately, these papers show that no conclusive gender 
difference exists in the ultimatum game. 
In addition to gender, other research examined how personal characteristics 
affect deception.  Irlenbusch, and Ter Meer (2013) focused on how personal 
characteristics affect lying behavior in a public goods game. Specifically, the authors 
managed to separate nice players from those who act slyly. Briefly, a public goods 
game involves a number of participants who all divide an amount of money between 
a public or private good in repeated rounds. The money spent on the public good 
becomes multiplied by a certain factor (in this case 1.6) and then spread amongst 
the entire group. A participant can keep all of the money spent on the private good.  
Lastly, each member of the group has 10 punish points that they can give to another 
member. Each punish point reduces the earnings of a participant by 3 units. The 
experiment adds punish points to total earnings. Therefore, the group eventually 
moves to a pattern where everyone contributes in order to avoid punishment. The 
authors use this procedure for one treatment. In the other treatment, after they 
make their respective contributions and before administering punishment, 
participants can tell others how many points they contributed. They do not have to 
report these points honestly.  After the public goods game concludes, the authors 
evaluated the participant’s social preferences through a questionnaire. The authors 
show that people who score higher on their social values tend to believe the 
reported scores at a higher rate and contribute more themselves. The authors do 
not go into specific detail regarding how the survey measures social values but they 
suggest it includes the desire to benefit a group over an individual. People with 
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lower social values can take advantage of this situation by recognizing that they can 
profit by announcing higher contributions and contributing with lower amounts. 
Moreover, those with lower social values managed to earn significantly more than 
people with higher value scores. One limitation of this result might come from the 
nature of the experimental setting. People may act more deceiving in an experiment 
than in the real world. Regardless, this paper sheds light on how behavior in 
experiments might reflect personal characteristics. While this result is exhibited 
through a public goods game, it has important implications for my study. 
Specifically, those who have certain inherent characteristics with regards to social 
preferences or ethics might have an advantage and might exploit or profit from “nice 
guys.” 
 
Experimental Design 
My procedure is built off a similar procedure to Besancenot et al.’s (2013) design for 
allowing for incomplete information. However, my own experiment contains five 
consecutive rounds with different experimental conditions in each round. 
Furthermore, no experiment, to my knowledge, has dealt with the possibility of 
revealing the endowment size based on probability. Previous studies lose external 
validity in real bargaining scenarios because in real life situations people put their 
credibility on the line for the sake of a lie. For example, when people buy used items 
or buy from retailers they may not have knowledge of the true quality of the good 
that they purchase. After some time with the item, a consumer might discover that a 
firm misrepresented through branding or false advertising. Ultimately, if sellers can 
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convince buyers that their goods have a higher value than in actuality, they can 
profit greatly and therefore may want to deceive the public. 
 The examples given above show how my experiment more accurately 
models real-world transactions by introducing to both participants the possibility 
that the endowment size would be revealed. The results of Schmitt (2004) and 
Croson et al. (2003) help explore how participants might behave during my design. 
Croson et al. show the effects of cheap talk and how people respond to lies and 
threats in bargaining games. Schmitt (2004) asserts that when there is incomplete 
information, proposers will act more selfishly. In other words, strategic minded 
proposers will look for the minimum amount that will ensure that the responder 
accepts their offer. The current literature shows that proposers often take 
advantage of the ability to misinform responders. Yet, their behavior might change if 
a there is a probability that the responder might catch the proposer in the act.  
 The experiment consists of a one shot ultimatum game repeated across five 
treatments. Participants were of 84 Connecticut College students and received $7 
for taking part in the experiment with the addition of any money made throughout. 
The experiment was conducted through using the program Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). Participants were paired anonymously and sent all messages and offers 
through the program. Across all five sessions, I varied the order of the treatments 
between two different orders to eliminate any potential effect the order might have 
on the results. Table 1 gives an overview of the treatments.  One treatment acts as a 
control treatment. In this round proposers have the ability to lie without the chance 
of the responders discovering their deception. In the second treatment (low 
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probability or LP), proposers have the option to tell the responders that they 
received any amount between 80-160 experimental currency units (ECUs) with a 
25% chance that the actual pie size will be revealed to the responder before they 
make the choice to accept or reject the offer. Both the proposer and the responder 
know (1) that the proposer has the ability to misinform the responder and (2) the 
exact odds that the computer will show the actual endowment size to the responder. 
The third treatment (high probability or HP) follows the same procedure as the 
second except the chances of the program revealing the endowment change to 75%.  
The fourth treatment (low probability threat or LPT) is the same as the second 
except now responders can threaten proposers. Threats involve a single one-way 
message from the responder to the proposer outlining what the responder plans to 
do if the offer is too low or he/she finds out that the proposer lied. The responder 
can tell the proposer both the minimum percentage of the endowment that s/he will 
accept and her/his reaction to misinformation. The wording for minimum was 
“What is the minimum proportion of the endowment that you will accept in 
percent?” The responder could also threaten to not accept any offer, if they proposer 
lied. The question asked, “If the stated endowment differs from the actual 
endowment will you accept the offer?” The responder could fill in a button with the 
options “will” or “will not”. The responder did not have to act on the threats sent to 
the proposer. The fifth treatment (high probability threat or HPT) is the same as the 
third with the addition of the ability for responders to send threats. Table 1 gives a 
summary of all the treatments in terms of probability and threats.  
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Table 1: Breakdown of Treatments 
Round Probability of a Reveal Threat Option 
Control 0% (no reveal) No 
LP 25% No 
HP 75% No 
HPT 75% Yes 
LPT 25% Yes 
 
 
 The order of the game is as follows. First, responders will have the option to send 
threats in the appropriate treatments. Next, proposers will send an offer with a 
proposed split and a claim as to the endowment size in all treatments. After the 
proposal, the actual pie size is revealed to the responder with the probabilities given 
above in specific treatments. Lastly, responders will either accept or reject the 
proposer’s offers.  
 All 84 participants participated in each treatment. Participants sat at 
computers in a single room and before beginning the game read instructions and 
completed a brief quiz to ensure comprehension of the rules. The instructions for 
each round and quiz are presented in Appendix B. Before each treatment, 
participants were reminded of the rules of the upcoming round on their computer 
screens. At the end of the experiment, participants received payment based on a 
randomly chosen round, revealed at the end of the session.  
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 Previous studies suggest that when proposers gain an informational 
advantage, they use it and lie to the responders (Croson et al., 2003; Besancenot et 
al. 2013; Veselý 2014). Therefore, I predict that the treatment without threats will 
show similar results to the Besancenot and Veselý experiments. Proposers will lie 
and understate their endowment to increase their earnings. Secondly, just like how 
responders in Besancenot et al.’s study did not believe lies from proposers, in my 
study, cheap talk from responders should not influence proposer decisions.  On the 
other hand, the ability to communicate threats might increase offers and result in 
less lying.  Lastly, in rounds with higher probabilities, proposers will not lie at all or 
will lower the magnitude of their lie in order to increase the odds of a responder 
accepting their offer.  
 
Results 
As expected, the data show a large difference in lying between the high probability 
and low probability treatments. I calculated the results using STATA versions 12 
and 13. %Sent represents the proportion of the endowment offered by proposers. 
%Reported measures lying; it is calculated as the proportion of the fake endowment 
to the real one, meaning that if the endowment was 100 ECUs and the proposer 
claimed they had 80 ECUs then the %Reported equals 80. A higher %Reported 
indicates an overall decrease in lying. The histograms show that high probability 
caused a large shift toward more truth telling while the addition of threats had a 
lesser affect. However, threats caused a larger increase in the distribution %Sent 
than the change caused by high and low probabilities. 
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Histograms for %Sent: 
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Histograms for %Reported: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
In order to test the means across the treatments, I used an OLS1 model to 
compare the percent reported and percent sent across all treatments. Since all the 
                                                        
1 All relevant models were also run with the endowment size in the regression. The results can be found in 
Appendix A 
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proposers received different endowments, %Reported acts as the best measure of 
deceit. Model 1 includes only the treatments. Model 2 adds number of economics 
courses taken and female as binary variables. To use this regression analysis to 
calculate %Reported in a given treatment, add the coefficient to the constant, or 
control value.  Specifically, the constant is the average in the control treatment and 
the coefficients show the differences in the other conditions, when compared to the 
control. For example in HPT, proposer reported that they received 95.47% of the 
actual endowment.   
The first two specifications look at the %Reported in each treatment 
compared to the control. Specification 2 adds demographic variables. In each 
treatment, except for LP, proposers reported proportionally more of the 
endowment. Specifications 3 and 4 use  %Sent as the dependent variable. The 
findings are identical to the patterns seen with %Reported. In every treatment, 
proposers also sent more with the exception of LP. These results indicate proposers 
lie significantly less and send significantly more in all treatments compared to the 
control. Perhaps the most interesting result that comes from examining this table is 
that there does not seem to be a difference when comparing lying between the HPT 
and HP treatments yet proposers send 5% more of their endowment in HPT 
compared to HP.  The differences in the coefficients between threat and non-threat 
treatments with regards to %Sent are far larger than differences the coefficients 
with regards to %Reported. Threats may influence the amount sent more than they 
change lying behavior. 
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Table 2: %Reported and %Sent across treatments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Model 1  
%Reported 
Model 2  
%Reported 
Model 1  
%Sent 
Model 2 
 %Sent 
     
LPT 6.628* 6.628* 7.465** 7.465** 
 (2.960) (2.967) (2.103) (2.101) 
HPT 11.25** 11.25** 9.885** 9.885** 
 (2.533) (2.540) (2.105) (2.108) 
HP 11.43** 11.43** 4.746** 4.746** 
 (2.659) (2.670) (1.774) (1.801) 
LP 1.997 1.997 2.078 2.078 
 (2.860) (2.865) (2.146) (2.167) 
Female  -0.533  1.232 
  (1.775)  (1.258) 
Num.of Econ. Courses  -0.220  0.0485 
  (0.315)  (0.259) 
Constant 83.56** 84.22** 37.98** 37.12** 
 (2.120) (2.552) (1.338) (1.563) 
     
Observations 210 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.136 0.138 0.121 0.125 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
There are, however, issues with using this method to calculate significance. 
OLS assumes the data comes from a normal distribution. Mann-Whitney tests avoid 
this problem, as the test does not make assumptions about the distribution. Instead, 
their tests examine whether the two sets of data come from the same population. If 
not, the samples are significantly different from each other and the test statistic is 
large enough to reject the null hypothesis that differences in treatments stem from 
chance. Table 2 and 3 compare the W-values of a series Mann-Whitney pairwise 
tests. Table 2 looks at pairwise tests comparing % Reported in the relevant rounds. 
The variables on the left column were in all cases lower than the variables in the 
headers. For this reason, the W-scores reported remain positive in all cases. In the 
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case of %Reported, treatments HPT, HP, and LPT all show reduced lying when 
compared to the control. LP has a lower reported value when compared to HP and 
LPT respectively. Lastly, LPT has less lying than the HPT treatment. These results 
align with the OLS data shown above and, expand on them, as individual treatments 
are compared against one another.  
Table 3: %Reported Wilcoxon. Left column distributions lower than headers 
Wilcoxon W 
(Probability 
Significance level) 
 
HPT HP LPT LP 
Control 4.133 
(.0000)** 
4.273 
(.0000)** 
 
2.329 
(.0198)* 
.625 
(.5317) 
LP  3.863 
(.0001)** 
2.019 
(.0435)* 
 
HP 
 
 
LPT 
.207 
(.8362) 
 
2.135 
(.0328)* 
 
   
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Similarly, table 3 shows the results of pairwise tests when looking at the %Sent 
variable. Once again, all rounds except LP show a significantly higher distribution 
than the control. When compared to LP, the %Sent increased in the LPT treatment. 
Lastly, proposers sent more in the HPT round when compared to the HP round. 
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Table 4: %Sent Wilcoxon. Left column distributions lower than headers 
Wilcoxon W 
(Probability 
Significance level) 
 
HPT HP LPT LP 
Control 4.595 
(.0000)** 
 
2.775 
(.0055)** 
3.528 
(.0004)** 
.850 
(.3953) 
LP  
 
1.933 
(.0532) 
2.909 
(.0036)** 
 
HP 
 
 
LPT 
 
2.831 
(.0173)* 
 
.887 
(.3753) 
 
   
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
This result shows that the ability to threaten increases the amount sent when the 
probability of getting caught remains constant.  
Next, I isolated the effect of the threat conditions, both LPT and HPT, on the 
%Sent and %Reported. The threat conditions contained variables that only 
pertained to those treatments. Therefore, by analyzing these rounds separately, the 
nuances of the responder’s threats emerge. The previous regressions show that the 
ability to threaten matters. Using the second set of regressions, it becomes clear 
exactly how the behavior of responders alters on the %Sent and %Reported. I used 
a standard OLS model to test how the different variables in threat conditions 
affected proposer behavior. Table 5 gives the results of the regressions. The “Will 
Not” variable is a dummy variable that shows whether responder told proposers 
they would not accept in the instance of a lie. Specifications 1 and 2 show the effect 
of the chosen variables on %Reported. Specification 2 adds controls for gender and 
the number of economics courses taken. The results show that the binary threat and 
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the minimum demanded do not have an effect on %Reported in either specification. 
Specifications 3 and 4 look at how the same variables affect %Sent. Minimum and 
gender both caused an increase in %Sent. Specifically, a one-percentage increase in 
the amount demanded led to a 0.44 percentage increase in the offered amount.  
Women, in the threat conditions, on average, offered 5.48% more of the endowment 
than men. The data show that the binary threat in the form of  “will” or “will not” 
does not change %Reported or %Sent Interestingly, when responders demanded 
more, proposers reported the same amount. Meaning that lying did not change with 
regards to the responder’s demands. In these treatments, both responders and 
proposers knew that the responder did not have to follow through on either aspect 
of their threat.  
These results help explain the patterns seen in the earlier regressions and 
the Mann-Whitney tests. It appears that the reason for an increase in %Sent, in 
threat treatments, comes from the demands of the responder. Proposers might have 
used that information to determine their offers while continuing the same lying 
behavior. Furthermore, they back up the contention that the threat options affect 
%Sent more than %Reported. As the previous regression shows, the threats, in the 
form of a demand, increase %Sent and not %Reported. 
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Table 5: OLS Models for threat rounds only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Model 1 
%Reported 
Model 2 
%Reported 
Model 1 
%Sent 
Model 
2 
%Sent 
 
      
High 4.563 4.550 0.0146 -0.0499  
 (2.620) (2.654) (1.829) 
 
(1.855)  
Will Not -0.450 -0.239 -0.558 -1.106  
 (2.466) (2.463) (2.234) (2.263) 
 
 
Minimum 0.0115 0.0129 0.430** 0.444**  
 (0.117) (0.123) (0.120) (0.110) 
 
 
Female  -0.0292  5.475**  
  (2.791)  (1.735) 
 
 
Num. Econ. 
Courses 
 -0.244 
(0.498) 
 0.296 
(0.454) 
 
      
Constant 89.95** 90.12** 26.03** 21.80**  
 (6.028) (7.003) (5.866) (5.270)  
      
Observations 84 84 84 84  
R-squared 0.041 0.044 0.262 0.331  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
The previous regression results show how threats and probabilities interact 
to change both the percentage sent and reported. Along with studying proposer’s 
decisions, the experimental design allows for an examination of the factors that 
cause a responder to accept or reject an offer. In order to run a regression on a 
binary variable, I used a logit model and then converted the coefficients to odds 
ratios. Model 1 contained three basic variables. Model 2 accounted for gender and 
the amount of economics courses taken. 
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If an offer was revealed and the reported amount increased then the 
proposer lied less, the responder was 1.091 times more likely to accept an offer 
rather than reject it if the percentage reported increased by one. Meaning that, as 
%Reported increased by one, and if the endowment was revealed, the responder 
was 9% more likely to accept. Reveals drastically reduced the likelihood of an 
acceptance by responders. This result most likely comes from the fact that 
responders have no reason to reject an offer that might look fair. However, if the 
endowment size gets revealed responders might punish lying or unfairness or both.  
Table 6: Odds ratios on accept 
 (Odds Ratios) (Odds Ratios) 
Accept Model 1 Model 2 
   
   
Reveal 0.000167** 0.000244** 
 (0.000509) 
 
(0.000742) 
%Reported 0.991 0.993 
 (0.0195) (0.0199) 
 
RevealX%Reported 1.096** 1.091** 
 (0.0372) (0.0368) 
 
Female  2.053 
  (0.839) 
 
Num. Econ. Courses  1.297 
  (0.274) 
 
Constant 12.93 6.048 
 (22.87) (11.09) 
   
Observations2 201 201 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
                                                        
2 There are fewer observations in this regression because 9 accepts results had to be dropped 
because of a coding error caught early on.  
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Lastly, I created to variables to look at fairness and pure truth telling. Truth 
equals 1 if the proposer acted with complete honesty, meaning that if reported is 
100 truth has a value of 1 and 0 if otherwise. The variable fair follows a similar 
process except using %Sent instead. I made the threshold for the fair variable 40%. 
Therefore, fair was equal to 1 if %Sent was greater than or equal to 40 and 0 if 
otherwise.  
 
Table 7: Odds Ratios on Truth and Fair 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Truth Odds Ratios Fair Odds Ratios 
   
   
High Probability 6.277** 2.712* 
 (3.060) (1.149) 
Threat Condition 1.537 2.621** 
 (0.509) (0.913) 
Low Probability 1.837 1.441 
 (0.903) (0.606) 
Female 0.460* 0.854 
 (0.148) (0.269) 
Num. Econ. Courses 1.016 1.013 
 (0.0630) (0.0592) 
Constant 0.363* 0.738 
 (0.158) (0.283) 
   
Observations 210 210 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
These regressions continue to confirm the results presented earlier. High 
probability rounds increase complete truth telling by a factor of 6.3 and increase the 
likelihood of a fair offer by a factor of 2.7. Threat conditions also increase the odds 
of receiving a fair offer. These data continue to show how probability affects lying 
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more than offers and how threats influence offers but have a lesser or no effect on 
lying.  The reasoning behind this trend may come from the demands of responder 
influencing the proposers to send more. Surprisingly, women told absolute truths 
less than men although the variable Truth might not be as indicative of lying as 
%Reported. Women may lie by the same amount as men, as the other regressions 
show, but are less likely to report the full endowment size.  
 
Limitations 
The biggest limitation for any experimental study is the issue of external validity. 
The real world contains many factors that researchers simply cannot measure in 
laboratory settings. With regards to my design, threats and exact probabilities 
simplify more complex phenomena. Bargaining often includes many steps of 
negotiation, and demands ebb and flow. The minimum demanded and will/will not 
variables model how people make demands in real world scenarios. Similarly, when 
dealing with unknown conditions, reality is far more complex than 25% and 75% 
odds. People in bargaining situations take steps to help improve the chances of 
getting a good deal but ultimately, they will not know probability to the same degree 
of certainty as they did in the experiment. Ultimately, these simplifications become 
necessary to create models of reality. Yet, they may hinder the ability for 
experiments of any kind to explain real life patterns.  
 Lastly, using a within subjects design always carries unavoidable issues. I 
created two different treatment orders to control for any learning or treatment 
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effects. However, a random treatment order may have been best but was not 
feasible given the limitations of time and Z-Tree’s features.  
 
Discussion 
First I will go over how my results compare to the asymmetric information studies 
presented earlier. Then, I will discuss how these results expand on this literature 
and also raise questions that future studies should test. In the control the 
%Reported’s average of 84% compares to Besancenot et al.’s (2013) value where 
the authors found that proposers understated the endowment by 20.5%.  Also, in 
accordance with other studies, my data show that proposers take advantage of 
being in a position of power through prevalent lying behavior (Veselý 2014, 
Besancenot et al. 2013). These data also support my predictions that proposers 
would understate their endowments and that the lying would decrease as 
probability increases.  
 In terms of the communications, there are two main possibilities for the 
decrease in lying in the threat treatments. First, the enhanced communication might 
have led proposers to offer more out of a sense of empathy. The ability for the 
responder to communicate might have caused the proposer to consider them in 
more human terms. Unlike Rankin’s (2003) findings, the results from this 
experiment suggest that demands by responders increase offers rather than 
decrease them. Rankin used an ultimatum game with complete information where 
responders could make demands of proposers. The demands caused proposers to 
lower their offers and therefore increased rejections rates. Rankin suggested that 
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proposers interpreted the demands as bluffs and may have acted purposefully 
against them.  However, his reasoning about bluffs does not hold up in conjunction 
with my results as both proposers and responders knew that the responder did not 
have to abide by their threats. The key difference between my experiment and his 
comes from complete vs. incomplete information. Demands may operate differently 
in ultimatum games with complete information compared to designs like mine that 
incorporate asymmetric information. Yet, the significance of the minimum demand 
might also make more sense than Rankin’s reasoning about bluffs as risk aversion 
will cause proposers to send more in the hopes of a responder accepting. However, 
as mentioned, my experiment incorporated asymmetric information and Rankin’s 
results may hold true only in a conventional ultimatum game setting. Either way, 
future research should deconstruct how demands by responder function in cases of 
asymmetric compared to complete information. While I was correct in my assertion 
that the communication rounds would result in higher offers, the results contradict 
my predictions and the findings of Rankin (2003) with regards to cheap talk by 
showing that proposers respond to cheap talk. The conflation between cheap talk 
and communication might create an interesting topic for another experiment 
designed to separate communication and cheap talk.  
 When looking at gender, the results show no differences except in the case of 
women sending more in the threat treatments and women are less likely to tell 
absolute truth. Unlike, Garcia-Gallego et al. (2012), my results do not show women 
offering more than men or women rejecting offers more than men. Their results 
may have come from Garcia-Gallego et al. (2012) framing the ultimatum game as a 
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job interview. Also my results do not support Veselý’s (2014) findings either. Veselý 
found that women made lower offers and engaged in more deception. Yet, my 
results show that men and women lied by the same proportion. While women had 
lower odds of telling the outright truth to responders, as mentioned earlier, 
%Reported is a better variable to judge the amount of lying. 
All of the experiments on gender have followed different procedures and 
experimental conditions. My results help expand the literature on gender by 
showing a meaningful gender difference only in the threat conditions. In this case, 
women may be acting in a less risky manner than men. Yet as Garcia-Gallego et al. 
(2012) show, this difference might not mean that women are inherently more risk 
averse than men.  
 In addition to expanding upon previous research, my study also expands the 
current literature on ultimatum games. No experiment, to my knowledge, has tested 
probability as a factor on lying behavior. The results clearly indicate that probability 
has a salient effect on how proposers decide to lie. A low probability of getting 
caught seems not to influence lying but a high probability drastically reduces the 
amount the proposers lie by and, as the histograms show, the frequency of people 
who lie. These results suggest that a threshold must exist where proposers decide it 
is no longer advantageous to underrepresent the endowment at the base rate. In 
terms of threats, lying behavior remained unchanged between the HP and HPT 
treatments but decreased between LP and LPT. The increased probability of being 
caught in a lie must have caused proposers to change their behavior such that the 
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addition of the threat had only a trivial effect. Yet, when the probability was low, the 
threat had more room to influence the decisions of proposers.  
As mentioned earlier, the threat rounds may have changed behavior through 
two mechanisms. First, it increased communication between the proposer and 
responder. Second, it provided proposers with a demand. The most interesting 
result when examining threats comes from the minimum demanded by responder in 
threat treatments and the frequency of fair offers in threat treatments. Proposers 
actively increased the amount that they sent as responders demanded more.  
However, proposers may have used the demand to make the offer appear slightly 
better; ultimately, the responder has no way knowing except when the endowment 
was revealed. At the very least, the response by proposers shows that they may have 
believed that the cheap talk was credible. With regards to the Fair variable, 
responders received consistently higher proportions of the endowment in threat 
conditions.  This result implies that cheap talk has a profound effect on the actions 
of proposers. Responders may have been willing to accept lower offers if they came 
in. Yet, proposers yielded to the demands made through their increased offers. 
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, we can see that the higher probability decreases lying while the threats 
increase the amount sent. Perhaps future research could examine the distinctions 
and interactions in lying and threats.  Although no experiment can perfectly model 
reality, my findings show a far more complex nature of bargaining than existed 
previously, as it takes into account demands in the forms of threats and 
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probabilities. Real bargaining scenarios constantly involve these factors in some, 
qualitative, if not quantitative manner. Therefore, the findings help explore the 
nuances of interactions under asymmetric information that occur millions of times 
every day. 
As we have seen, threats have the largest effects on fair allocations while 
probabilities change lying behavior. It seems natural, almost necessary, to break 
down bargaining into these two aspects: the demands of one party vs. the honesty of 
the other. Arguably, most proposers acted more honestly in fear of a rejection or a 
lower pay off. The best analogy for this game is to think of the proposer as a seller of 
a good with an unknown quality and the responder as a potential buyer of this item. 
In the real world, sellers of goods, companies, stocks and other merchandise have 
their reputations on the line. As such, the cost of being revealed as a fraud increases 
greatly from maybe a few dollars to the collapse of a company. As the stakes rise a 
small increase in the probability of being caught might dissuade deceptive behavior 
by a much larger amount.  On the other side of the equation, there are the 
bargainers who will try to extract as much from the seller as possible. They will 
demand a specific price for the item. Apparently, if the buyer in this case issues such 
a statement, the seller would rather give into the buyer’s demand in order to ensure 
the closure of the deal rather than let the buyer walk away. Of course, in reality, 
sellers can attempt to find another buyer. In the experiment, the one shot nature of 
the game put more pressure on proposer to take the demands of responders 
seriously.  
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Lastly, as I mentioned earlier, my experiment helps shed light on why review 
sites and customer reviews for an assortment of items matter. Essentially, these 
evaluations take guessing out of the equation for the buyer. The buyer knows the 
quality of the item that they hope to attain and the seller has a motivation to display 
that item honestly. Reviews greatly increase the probability of a fake item of any 
kind, being revealed to the public. As the results show, probability has a large effect 
on lying behavior. Customer reviews, in this manner, give power to the buyers and 
help to ensure that they receive a fair trade.  
This research merely scratches the surface when exploring the interactions 
of probabilities and threats. It provides one of the most complete and realistic 
examinations of the ultimatum game to date. Future research needs to explore this 
topic in greater depth as important questions remain. For instance, it is not clear 
whether threats influence proposers because of an increase in communication or 
because proposers believe the cheap talk. Also, a future experiment may want to 
examine in greater detail how probabilities and threats interact to change lying and 
offers respectively.  
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Appendix A: Endowment Size Regressions 
OLS comparison 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 
Reported 
Model 2 
%Reported 
Model 
%Sent 
Model 2 
%Sent 
     
LPT 6.628* 6.573* 7.465** 7.445** 
 (2.960) (2.599) (2.103) (2.107) 
HPT 11.25** 11.54** 9.885** 9.997** 
 (2.533) (2.217) (2.105) (2.067) 
HP 11.43** 12.57** 4.746** 5.175** 
 (2.659) (2.458) (1.774) (1.800) 
LP 1.997 2.960 2.078 2.441 
 (2.860) (2.478) (2.146) (2.164) 
Female  0.824  1.743 
  (1.625)  (1.268) 
Num. Econ. 
Courses 
 -0.309  0.0150 
  (0.302)  (0.255) 
Endowment Size  -0.212**  -0.0798** 
  (0.0337)  (0.0283) 
Constant 83.56** 108.5** 37.98** 46.29** 
 (2.120) (4.076) (1.338) (3.648) 
     
Observations 210 210 210 210 
R-squared 0.136 0.285 0.121 0.157 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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OLS Threat Conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 
%Reported 
Model 2 
%Reported 
Model 1 
%Sent 
Model 2 
%Sent 
     
High 4.563 5.029* 0.0146 0.177 
 (2.620) (2.481) (1.829) (1.819) 
Will Not -0.450 -0.0565 -0.558 -1.019 
 (2.466) (2.259) (2.234) (2.227) 
Minimum 0.0115 -0.0147 0.430** 0.431** 
 (0.117) (0.108) (0.120) (0.102) 
Female  1.923  6.400** 
  (2.619)  (1.649) 
Num. Econ. 
Courses 
 -0.511  0.170 
  (0.389)  (0.439) 
Endowment Size  -0.197**  -0.0934* 
  (0.0505)  (0.0418) 
Constant 89.95** 113.7** 26.03** 32.97** 
 (6.028) (7.286) (5.866) (7.102) 
     
Observations 84 84 84 84 
R-squared 0.041 0.204 0.262 0.375 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Truth and Fair 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Truth Odds Ratios Fair Odds Ratios 
   
High Probability 7.134*** 3.128** 
 (3.504) (1.399) 
Threat Condition 1.470 2.519*** 
 (0.500) (0.883) 
Low Probability 1.957 1.582 
 (0.959) (0.702) 
Female 0.499** 0.941 
 (0.163) (0.305) 
Num. Econ. Courses 1.005 1.009 
 (0.0668) (0.0646) 
Endowment Size 0.984** 0.982** 
 (0.00649) (0.00689) 
Constant 2.217 5.722** 
 (1.941) (4.965) 
   
Observations 210 210 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Instructions and Quiz 
 
Instructions:  
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. You will be paid cash 
earnings based on decisions that you make and decisions that other people in 
the experiment make. 
 
During the experiment, you will make decisions that involve ECUs, which stand 
for experimental currency units. ECUs will be exchanged for dollars at a rate of 10-
to-1, which means that 10 ECUs will equal $1. This exchange rate is written on the 
board behind me. 
 
The experiment will last for 5 rounds. After the five rounds are complete, the 
computer will randomly select one of these rounds. The one selected round will 
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determine how much money you make in the experiment. So note that you will be 
paid based on the outcome of one of the five rounds, but you will not know which 
round this will be when you are making your decisions. 
 
At this point, please make sure that your cell phones are silenced. Please do not talk 
to any other participants or look at their screens. Your decisions in 
the experiment will be private, and no other participant will know what choices you 
make. If you have a question at any point during the experiment, quietly raise your 
hand and somebody will come to assist you. You will be paid in cash at the end of 
the experiment. 
 
There are two possible roles in the experiment, and you will occupy the same role 
throughout the entire experiment. The two roles are Proposers and Responders, so 
you will either be a Proposer or a Responder throughout the entire experiment.  
 
In each round, you will make decisions that involve ECUs, which stand for 
experimental currency units. At the end of the experiment, ECUs will be exchanged 
for dollars at a rate of 10-1. This means that you will receive $1 for every 10 ECUs 
that you acquire rounded to the nearest dollar.  
 
At the start of each round, the Proposer will receive between 80 and 160 ECUs. The 
Proposer will then suggest an offer in which they chose how much of the money to 
allocate to the Responder. 
 
The Responder can either accept or reject the Proposer’s offer. If the Responder 
accepts the offer, the Responder receives the offer and the Proposer receives the 
endowment subtracted from the offer. However, if the Responder rejects the offer, 
both participants receive nothing. 
 
This experiment will consist of 5 rounds. 
 
Round 1:  
 
The Proposer will receive an endowment between 80 and 160 ECUs and make an 
offer to the Responder 
The Proposer can tell the Responder they received any amount of ECUs between 
these two values. 
 
The Responder will not know the size of the endowment.  
 
 
Round 2: 
 
The Responder will have the ability to threaten the Proposer with how they will 
react to the decisions made by the Proposer.  
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The Responder will tell the Proposer the minimum percentage of the endowment 
they will accept. They will also inform the Proposer whether they will or will not 
accept an offer if the Proposer is caught misrepresenting the size of the endowment.  
 
The Proposer will receive an endowment between 80 and 160 ECUs. Before making 
his or her offer, the Proposer must send a message to the Responder, indicating the 
amount of the initial endowment that she or he received.  
 
The Proposer can tell the Responder they received any amount of ECUs between 
these two values. 
 
However, there is a 25% chance that the Responder will find out the actual size of 
the endowment.  
 
In Round 3: 
 
The Responder will have the ability to threaten the Proposer with how they will 
react to the decisions made by the Proposer.  
 
The Responder will tell the Proposer the minimum percentage of the endowment 
they will accept. They will also inform the Proposer whether they will or will not 
accept an offer if the Proposer is caught misrepresenting the size of the endowment.  
 
The Proposer will receive an endowment between 80 and 160 ECUs. Before making 
his or her offer, the Proposer must send a message to the Responder, indicating the 
amount of the initial endowment that she or he received.  
 
The Proposer can tell the Responder they received any amount of ECUs between 
these two values. 
 
However, there is a 75% chance that the Responder will find out the actual size of 
the endowment.  
 
 
In round 4: 
 
The Proposer will receive an endowment between 80 and 160 ECUs. Before making 
his or her offer, the Proposer must send a message to the Responder, indicating the 
amount of the initial endowment that she or he received.  
 
However, there is a 75% chance that the Responder will find out the actual size of 
the endowment.  
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Round 5: 
 
The Proposer will receive an endowment between 80 and 160 ECUs. Before making 
his or her offer, the Proposer must send a message to the Responder, indicating the 
amount of the initial endowment that she or he received.  
 
The Proposer can tell the Responder they received any amount of ECUs between 
these two values. 
 
However, there is a 25% chance that the Responder will find out the actual size of 
the endowment.  
 
 
Before each round, you will be reminded of the conditions that apply in the 
upcoming round.  
 
 
Quiz:  
 
Question 1: 
 
Suppose that you are a Proposer and a Responder starts the round by telling you 
that s/he will not accept less than 30% of the endowment and will outright reject 
the offer if you misrepresent the endowment. 
 
You receive an endowment of 45 ECUs and offer the Responder 15 and tell the 
Responder you received 30 ECUs.  You are told that there is a 75% chance that the 
Responder will learn the actual size of the endowment. 
 
The Responder finds out that you misrepresented the endowment and rejects your 
offer.  
 
How many ECUs does each person receive in this scenario? 
 
Question 2: 
  
Suppose that you are a Responder and a Proposer tells you s/he receives an 
endowment of 56 ECUs and offers you 25 ECUs. 
 
You then find out the actual endowment was 80 ECUs but decide to accept the offer 
anyway. 
 
How many ECUs does each person receive in this scenario? 
 
Question 3: 
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 Suppose that the Proposer is told that there is a 10% chance that the the[SIC] pie 
will be revealed. Does this mean that the Responder is likely or unlikely to learn the 
actual size of the Proposer's endowment?  
 
Question 4: 
 
 Suppose that the Proposer is told that there is a 90% chance that the the[SIC] pie 
will be revealed. Does this mean that the the[SIC] Responder is likely or unlikely to 
learn the actual size of the Proposer's endowment? 
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